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Abstract
This paper explores excuse-driven behavior in giving. In our pow-
ered laboratory experiment, participants play Dictator Games sharing
5e or 1,000e under certainty or ambiguity with a charity. In contrast
to previous papers using MPLs –that necessarily introduce additional
layers of uncertainty–our subjects participate in two DGs. We find no
evidence that people use moral wiggles to hide their selfishness. They
share equally out of 5e under certainty and ambiguity and as much
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out of 1,000e under ambiguity as they do under certainty in the pre-
vious literature. These findings raise the question whether previous
results might be an artifact.
Keywords: Giving, charity, uncertainty, ambiguity, stakes.
JEL codes: D64, D81, C91.
1 Introduction
Generous behavior in the Dictator Game (DG, hereafter) is well documented.
Subjects donate an average of 30% of the pie and few keep the entire pie for
themselves; if the recipient is a charity, the donations are even higher and
many donate the whole pie (see Engel (2011) for a meta-study).
Although these numbers support the idea of “pro-social” human behavior,
the vast majority of research has been conducted under certainty.1 Never-
theless, donors to charities are rarely fully aware of how their money will
be used and to what extent their goals will be achieved, parents while shar-
ing with/saving for their offspring cannot predict how their “gifts” will af-
fect their children’s life, physicians exert costly effort on their patients even
though the result of their work depend on a myriad of aspects out of their
control, or the money inverted in the prevention of climate change for future
generations has largely unpredictable consequences. All these acts of altru-
ism toward others involve considerable degree of ambiguity and the stakes at
play are large. Since these examples represent important aspects of human
life and the humanity as a whole, we need to understand how the combination
of ambiguity and large stakes shapes human generosity.
1For the sake of clarity, we follow the following terminology. Certainty refers to sit-
uations, in which subjects know the size of the pie, the amount of money they receive,
and the amount received by the recipients. Under uncertainty, at least one aspect of the
situation is not known with certainty. The term risk is employed for cases, in which the
probabilities of different events are known, and ambiguity for cases when the probabilities
are unknown. See e.g. Ellsberg (1961); Kova´rˇ´ık (2015); Trautmann and Van De Kuilen
(2015).
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Uncertainty should affect the behavior of a standard expected-utility max-
imizer in a particular way, but people may use uncertainty–be at risk or
ambiguity–strategically to share less without affecting their social image, a
phenomenon termed “moral wiggle room” (Dana et al., 2007). Haisley and
Weber (2010), Brock et al. (2013) and Cettolin et al. (2017) indeed support
this idea in situations, in which the donated quantity is risky. Exley (2015)
reports evidence that this is due to “motivated reasoning” that helps to jus-
tify behaving less generously. The effects of uncertainty are weaker when the
risk is either on the Dictators’ or on both sides though (Brock et al., 2013;
Cettolin et al., 2017). As for ambiguity, Haisley and Weber (2010) find that
subjects are less generous under ambiguity compared to risk, arguing that
ambiguity reinforces the excuses to give less. Nevertheless, Cettolin et al.
(2017) and Garcia et al. (2018) find no differences in giving under ambiguity
versus risk.2 This evidence notwithstanding, there is one key aspect of these
studies: they typically elicit the behavior using multiple price lists, paying
subjects for one randomly chosen decision within each list and paying for
one or two randomly chosen lists.3 However, such a payment scheme neces-
sarily introduces additional layers of uncertainty into the decision problem,4
confounding the impact of uncertainty generated by the design and by the
payment scheme.5 We claim that, independently of the forces introduced by
such incentive structures and their effects on subjects’ behavior, they prevent
a clean measure of the introduction of uncertainty into the decision of how
2Kellner et al. (2019) test how people share their prize from a lottery before and after
they learn whether they win.
3Haisley and Weber (2010) is an exception.
4In fact, this converts the standard DG, used as a benchmark in e.g. Brock et al. (2013)
or Exley (2015), into a choice under uncertainty.
5This payment methodology–at least–introduces additional risk and complexity into
the decision problem that may affect subjects decisions directly through their uncertainty
attitudes or indirectly through their cognitive limitations and/or biases. For example,
there exist large evidence that humans face difficulties computing probabilities, an effect
reinforced in compound lotteries (Wakker, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2015), many people are
averse to compound risk (Halevy, 2007; Abdellaoui et al., 2015) or to complexity (Kova´rˇ´ık
et al., 2016; Amador et al., 2019).
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much to donate.6
As for stakes, the evidence ranges from strong negative effects of stakes
on giving (Leibbrandt et al., 2015) through mild effects (List and Cherry,
2008; Novakova and Flegr, 2013; Raihani et al., 2013) to positive effects in
Andersen et al. (2018). However, all these studies have been conducted under
certainty. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no evidence regarding
the effect of stakes on excuse-driven behavior in the presence of moral wiggle
room.
This paper reports two main studies testing to what extent stakes affect
giving to charity under ambiguity. Study I analyzes whether subjects use
ambiguity as an excuse to donate less out of 5e when both the amount held
for themselves and the part donated to the charity are subject to the same
degree of ambiguity, compared to certain 5e. Study II was designed to test
the effect of stakes: it compares how people distribute ambiguous 5e vs.
1000e between themselves and a charity. Study III replicates both Study I
and II.
Our analysis enrich the existing evidence in several ways. First, our sam-
ple was predefined by statistical power. The sample is large enough to detect
an average effect of 0.4SD, with a power of 0.8 and a significance level of 90%.
Second, in contrast to studies employing multiple price lists that introduce an
additional layer of uncertainty, subjects in Studies I and II decide twice, min-
imizing learning and moral cleansing across decisions (Bran˜as-Garza et al.,
2013), and both decisions are paid. Moreover, our main results only use the
first decision of each subject. Third, to test the robustness of our results, we
directly reproduce our findings in an independent study (Study III, hereafter)
with a different subject pool. Fourth and most importantly, we the first to
investigate whether stakes matter for generosity in the presence of the moral
6We do not advocate against multiple price lists generally. As any other elicitation
protocol, they have their advantages and drawbacks. The point we raise is that they
introduce additional uncertainty into experiments studying the effect of the introduction
of uncertainty.
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wiggle room.
Our data reject the hypothesis that people hide their non-selfish mo-
tives behind uncertainty, independently of the amount distributed. In fact,
subjects give 11.46% more under ambiguity than under certainty if they dis-
tribute 5e (t − test = 2.04, p = 0.043). As for stakes, participants donate
32.55% less while distributing ambiguous 1000e compared to an equivalent
situation in which 5e are distributed (t = −7.112; p < 0.0001). Nevertheless,
such a decline is in line with the effect of stakes in the DG under certainty
documented in the literature. Since Study III corroborates the findings with
a different sample, we conclude that people do not exploit the moral wiggle
room provided by the ambiguity. Since the studies that include both risk
and ambiguity never find larger giving under risk than ambiguity, we believe
that these conclusions would extend to the comparison of certainty and risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
general design features. Sections 3 - 5 present the details of each study. The
last section concludes.
2 Experimental Procedures
A total of 620 students of the University Loyola Andalucia in Spain (ULA,
henceforth), enrolled in a number of courses across different fields of study
and the two campuses of ULA, participated in our experiments. Each stu-
dent was only allowed to participate in one of the sessions. We conducted
multiple sessions and each session lasted approximately an hour. The ex-
perimenters recruited the subject for an experimental study, in which they
could earn money. Students who agreed to participated were seated in a
classroom and provided the instructions explaining the anonymity rules, the
procedures, and compensation in the experiment. Instructions were given in
written form and questions were solved in private. Since all sessions were con-
ducted in classrooms, the data was elicited using paper and pencil. Ethics
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Committee of the Universidad Loyola Andaluc´ıa approved the experiment
and all participants signed an informed consent.
During the instruction process, the participants first signed a written
consent and they were informed that they would receive 5e only for their
participation (i.e., with certainty). They were then informed that, during the
experiment, they would have a chance to earn more money. In particular,
they were informed that their choices could earn them another 5e and they
would independently participate in a lottery for another 1000e. However,
no subject was informed about any other detail regarding what would be
the content of the experiment, which choices they would make, what would
determine whether they earn these quantities etc. That is, they were entirely
agnostic regarding the next phase of the experiment, including the odds of
earning the money. In the terminology of this paper, the probabilities of
earning the extra 5e and 1000e were ambiguous for the participants.
Once instructed, all subjects were invited to fill up a questionnaire elic-
iting individual heterogeneity (socio-demographics, risk and social attitudes,
etc.). Most importantly, the questionnaire contained two (Studies I and II)
or three (Study III) DGs against a charity of their choice.7
As for the three DGs implemented, they differed in two dimensions, the
stake and the (un)certainty of the amount distributed, as follows:
• DG5. In this game, each participant can donate any part of the 5e
she receives for participation to a charity of her choice. Since subjects
knew at the moment of the decisions that they receive these 5e with
certainty, DG5 is a standard five-euro DG under certainty.
• DG5A. In this case, each participants can donate any part of the 5e
she can earn during the experiment and the donation would be imple-
mented if they won the 5e. Given the information people possessed
7More precisely, the instructions listed five charities particularly popular in Spain as
well as an option “Other” that allowed subjects to name any other charity of their choice.
Many actually did.
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regarding the possibility to earn the 5e while choosing, DG5A is a
five-euro DG under ambiguity.
• DG1000A. Since DG1000A only differs from DG5A in the stake dis-
tributed, it is a one-thousand-euro DG under ambiguity.
Our subjects participated in two main studies (labeled as Study I and
Study II, respectively) and one replication experiment (Study III). In Study I,
people make choices in both DG5 and DG5A; in Study II, people participated
in DG5A and DG1000A. In both studies, roughly 50% of subjects answered
one DG first and the other one second whereas the other 50% faced the games
in the reverse order. In our replication Study III, the subjects faced the three
DGs and we again control for potential ordered effects. This considerations
notwithstanding, our main results are based on the very first decision only.
See below for more details regarding each study.
Independently of whether a subject participated in two or three DGs, all
the decisions were implemented and they were implemented independently.
That is, in contrast to the multiple price lists where choosing one decision
for implementation decreases the probability of choosing any other one, the
implementation was independent in our experiment. Therefore, every single
decision has real monetary consequences.
Only once all participants have handed in their choices in the DGs, we
distributed the instructions and sheets for the second part of the experiment
that aimed at eliciting social networks in their classes. Whether a subject
has actually earned 5e, 1000e, or both was determined by her answers and
the answers of other members of her class, but this was not known to the
subjects while providing answers to the DGs analyzed in this paper.
The following sections describe each of our three studies separately.
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3 Study I: Ambiguity versus certainty
Similarly to the previous literature (see Haisley and Weber, 2010; Cettolin
et al., 2017; Garcia et al., 2018), Study I tests the hypothesis that people
use ambiguity as an excuse to behave selfishly employing stakes common in
the experimental literature. This section is organized in two subsections, one
describing particular design features of this study and one presenting the
results.
3.1 Sample, design and power
Sample: For an average effect of 0.33SD, with a power of 0.8 and a signifi-
cance level of 90%, we needed a sample size of n = 200 for a single treatment
(baseline + treatment); see Appendix A.1 for details. Hence, Study I com-
prises 204 university students (56.93% females).
Experimental tasks: Each subject faced two DGs (DG5 and DG5A) against
a charity of their choice both of them involving real money but differing in
whether the money was certain or not. In both games, the Dictators were
invited to share any fraction of the 5e from the set (0%, 10%, 20%, . . . , 100%
of the pie). Subjects had no information whatsoever about the probability
of earning the 5e in DG5A. They were only informed that there would be a
chance to earn the money in a subsequent task.
Order effects and random assignment: Since each subject faced both
games, we label the two choices using a subscript t = 0, 1 and implement
both orders. Subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment (order) with
p = 1/2:
T0: The sequence DG50 first and then DG5A1 (n = 104).
T1: The sequence DG5A0 first and then DG51 (n = 100).
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3.2 Results
The main text mostly focuses on the first decision of every participant (that
is, DG50 and DG5A0 in Study I) using between-subject comparisons. The
second decisions are mentioned only briefly in the main text and mostly
relegated to the Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of donations in DG50 and DG5A0. Both
distributions are very similar to the distributions reported in the literature in
the DG against a charity, including the modal choice of donating the whole
pie (see Figure 4 in Engel, 2011).
Figure 1: Donations in DG5 and DG5A
Concerning the efffect of ambiguity, the figure suggests that people give
somewhat more in DG5A0 than DG50. There is a larger fraction of sub-
jects keeping the entire endowment for themselves and fewer people giving
amounts around 50% and 100% of the pie in the latter case. On average, sub-
jects donate 50.792% of the pie in DG5A0 while the fraction drops to 39.32%
in DG50. This difference of 11.46% is significant at 5% (t − test = 2.04,
p = 0.043).
The donations decrease in t1, independently of the order (see Appendix).
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8Although we are aware of no study that would repeat giving to charity, people com-
monly decrease their giving in the DG over repetitions (Engel, 2011), an effect that seems
to be stronger for men (Espinosa and Kova´rˇ´ık, 2015).
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People give an average of 37.70% in DG51 and 36.35% in DG5A1; the differ-
ence is not statistical significant (t − test = −0.240; p = 0.808). Although
we are aware that the comparison in t1 is hard to interpret because of the
differing subjects’ histories in the two treatments, the numbers confirm that
ambiguity does not seem to be exploited to hide one’s selfishness.9 As a
result, we conclude:
Result 1: Subjects do not use ambiguity as an excuse to give less under 5e.
4 Study II: Effect of stakes under ambiguity
Under certainty, the literature reports a timid impact of stakes on giving with
some differences across studies (see e.g. List and Cherry, 2008; Novakova and
Flegr, 2013; Raihani et al., 2013; Leibbrandt et al., 2015; Andersen et al.,
2018).10 To the best of our knowledge, we present the first analysis of the
effect of stakes on giving under ambiguity.
4.1 Sample, design and power
Sample: For an average effect of 0.33SD, with a power of 0.8 and a signifi-
cance level of 90%, we need a sample size of n = 200 for a single treatment
(baseline + treatment). Study 2 comprises 202 participants (54.46% females).
Experimental tasks: Each subject faced two DGs (DG5A and DG1000A)
against a charity of her choice both of them involving real money but differing
in the size of the pie. In both cases, subjects were invited to sare any fraction
of the pie from the set (0%, 10%, 20%, . . . , 100% of the pie) without having
any information whatsoever about the probability of earning the pie to be
9Appendix A2 reports the within-subject analysis of the transition from t0 to t1 leading
to the same conclusion (see Result A1).
10In contrast, Slonim and Roth (1998) report that rejections in the Ultimatum Game
vanish with learning under high stakes.
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distributed but knowing that if they do the pies would be 5e in DG5A and
1,000e in DG1000A.
Order effects and random assignment: Subjects were randomly assigned
to one of the two treatments (game orders) with p = 1/2:
T0: The sequence DG50 first and then DG1000A1 (n = 106).
T1: The sequence DG1000A0 first and then DG5A1 (n = 96).
4.2 Results
Figure 2 plots the distributions of the amounts donated to charity in DG5A0
and DG1000A0. We observe that, in relative terms, the subjects are far more
generous in DG5A0 donating an average of 51.22% of the pie, compared to
18.67% in DG1000A0.
11 In sharp contrast to DG5A0, almost no participant
gives away the whole pie in DG1000A0 and the majority of donations is
concentrated around low fractions (≤ 20%). In quantitative terms, subjects
decrease their donation by 32.55% if stakes are high (t = −7.112; p < 0.0001).
Figure 2: Donations in DG5A0 and DG1000A0
11We note that giving in DG5A0 is identical in Studies I and II (t = −0.076; p = 0.939).
The average donations are 50.79% and 51.22%, respectively.
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Subjects again decrease their donations in t = 1, but the ranking is
preserved. The average donation in DG5A1 is 24.86% while people give an
average of 16.53% in DG1000A0. Although the difference is significant at
3% (t = 2.190; p = 0.030), remember that people have different experiences
and the t = 1 result thus has to be interpreted with caution. Appendix A3
extends this analysis.
Result 2: Under ambiguity, people donate less if they distribute 1,000e compared
to 5e.
4.3 Certainty vs. ambiguity with high stakes
Although Result 2 might suggest that people use ambiguity as an excuse
to share less with others if the stakes at play are high, it confounds two
forces, the effect of stakes and that of ambiguity. A direct test of such a
claim requires a treatment, in which people share 1,000e with a charity
of their choice under certainty. Nevertheless, the necessary sample size for
such an exercise requires at least 100 additional subjects, corresponding to
100× 1, 000 = $100, 000.12
To test whether people use ambiguity as an excuse to share less while
distributing 1,000e, we extrapolate how much people would donate in a
treatment described above on basis of the effects documented in the literature
on the role of stakes in the DG under certainty. For instance, List and Cherry
(2008) report an average giving of 33% for a $20 and $28.31 for a $100 pie.
Leibbrandt et al. (2015) find considerably more selfish behavior under high
stakes: the average giving is 25% for 100 (Bangladeshi) Taka and 3.67% for
10,000 Taka. In contrast, Andersen et al. (2018) document more generous
behavior for high stakes: the average increases from 11.2% in a five-euro DG
to 16.94% if 50e are distributed.
12Note also that the common approaches to overcome such a problem, such as paying
to a certain number of randomly chosen subjects, necessarily introduces uncertainty as
discussed in Section 1 and is thus out of the question.
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An important source of heterogeneity across the studies is the multipli-
cation factor, f . For example, List and Cherry (2008) compares $20 and
$100 pies, corresponding to a multiplication factor f = 5, Andersen et al.
(2018) moves from 5e to 50e (f = 10), or Leibbrandt et al. (2015) compare
endowments of 100 and 10,000 Taka (f = 100). We organise the existing 12
studies in 5 groups in function of the factor f as follows:13
• f = 5 (3 studies): Raihani et al. (R1, R3) and List and Cherry (LC1).
• f = 10 (5 studies): Novakova and Flegr (NF1); Andersen et al.(AGKM1);
Carpenter et al. (CVB1), and Raihani et al. (R2, R4).
• f = 100 (2 studies): Novakova and Flegr (NF2) and Leibbrandt et al.
(LMN1).
• f = 1K (1 study): Novakova and Flegr (NF3).
• f = 10K (1 study): Novakova and Flegr (NF4).
For each study i, we compute the treatment effect for a unitary varia-
tion of the multiplication factor. Formally, βˆfi =
xH−xL
fi
where xH and xH
are the average fraction of the pie share in the high and low treatments,
respectively, and fi is the multiplication factor in study i = 1, 2, ..., 12. Ta-
ble 1 in the Appendix lists the treatment effects βˆfi for each study under
scrutiny. With these βˆfi in hand, we compute the average treatment effect
for every group f ∈ {5, 10, 100, 1K, 10K}. The shaded bars in Figure 3 plot
such average treatment effects in function of f , illustrating how giving varies
with the manipulation of stakes in the literature. The impact of stakes is al-
ways negative: people decrease their donations for higher stakes.14 However,
the effect decreases gradually. It is large for small multiplications factors,
moderate per medium variation in stakes, and Figure 3 suggests that the
13See Appendix A.4 for a more detailed description of the studies.
14This is true in all the studies under scrutiny, except Andersen et al. (2018).
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effect virtually disappears for very large multiplication factors (βˆf < 0.005
for f = 1K, 10K).
Figure 3: The effect of stakes on giving: Certainty (shaded bars) vs. ambi-
guity (white bar with 95% confidence interval.)
Most importantly, Figure 3 allows to extrapolate which is the likely effect
of f = 200 under certainty. In particular, the figure shows that the effect
might lie somewhere between βˆ100 = −0.126 and βˆ1K = −0.004. Study II
provides the treatment effect in our DGs under ambiguity: βˆSII = −0.163,
included in Figure 3 (see the white bar). Our estimated treatment effect is
slightly higher than βˆ100 = −0.125 but the latter value lies within the interval
[−0.2079;−0.1176], the 95% confidence interval of our estimated treatment
effect (see the horizontal bars in Figure 3).15 Hence, we cannot reject that
high stakes affect giving under ambiguity in our data as much as it does under
certainty for f = 100. Moreover, note that βˆ100 is computed on basis of two
studies: Novakova and Flegr (2013) use hypothetical payments and report
a per-unit treatment effect of -0.036 and Leibbrandt et al. (2015) report an
15We use a simple linear regression with robust standard errors to estimate our treat-
ment effect for unitary change of the multiplication factor f in Study II to test whether
the treatment effects differs from the analyzed studies. If we use either ordered-logit or
censored regressions instead, the conclusion that people do not exploit ambiguity to give
less is never affected.
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effect of -0.2156 using monetary incentives. Our treatment effect falls in
between these two values: it is statistically higher than the former (F =
40.02; p < 0.0001) while statistically lower than the latter (F = 4.82; p =
0.029). Hence, we conclude that–as Study I–we find no evidence that people
use ambiguity as an excuse to give less in our DG1000A.16
Result 3: People do not use ambiguity as an excuse to give less under 1,000e.
5 Study III: Replication
Study III tests whether the results of Studies I and II can be replicated with
a new sample of subjects and a minimum design change.
5.1 Sample, design and power
Sample: For an average effect of 0.4SD, with a power of 0.8 and a significance
level of 90%, we need a sample size of n = 200 baseline + 2 treatments (see
Appendix A.1). Study III comprises 214 participants (73.364% females).
Experimental tasks: In Study III, subjects faced the three DG (DG5,
DG5A, and DG1000A) against a charity of their choice, the three of them
involving real money and following the same experimental protocols as in
Studies I and II.
Order effects and random assignment: We ran all the possible sequences
of the three DG and subjects were randomly assigned to their treatment
(order) with p = 1/6. The following list contains all the possible game orders,
where t = 0, 1, 2 refers to the first, second, and third decision, respectively:
16Our estimated effect is statistically higher than that of f = 1K in Novakova and Flegr
(2013). However, we give more weight on Leibbrandt et al. (2015) for two reasons. First,
f = 1K is considerably higher than f = 200, implemented in our study. Second, the
payoffs in Novakova and Flegr (2013) are hypothetical while Leibbrandt et al. (2015) pay
their subjects and the stakes are worth months of average income.
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T0: Sequence DG1000A0 → DG51 → DG5A2 (n = 37).
T1: Sequence DG1000A0 → DG5A1 → DG52 (n = 36).
T2: Sequence DG5A0 → DG1000A1 → DG52 (n = 36).
T3: Sequence DG5A0 → DG51 → DG1000A2 (n = 37).
T4: Sequence DG50 → DG5A1 → DG1000A2 (n = 34).
T5: Sequence DG50 → DG1000A1 → DG5A2 (n = 34).
In order to replicate Results 1 and 2, we focus on the first choices in all
treatments. More precisely, the first decisions in T0 and T1 serve to assess
the behavior in DG1000A (n = 73), T2 and T3 in DG5A (n = 73), and T4
and T5 in DG5 (n = 68).
5.2 Results
Figure 4 shows the distributions of giving in DG50 (black bars), DG5A0
(white bars), and DG1000A0 (shaded bars). First of all, the behavior in
Study III is statistically indistinguishable from Studies I and II.17
Second, in line with Study I, the distribution of behavior is very similar
in DG50 and DG5A0: many people give the 5e to charity, many do not
share, and a minority share intermediate amounts. The average donations
are 41.04% in DG50 and 43.09% in DG5A0, but this difference is statically
insignificant in Study III (t − test = −0.311; p = 0.377). Hence, we again
conclude that people do not use ambiguity as an excuse to donate less.
Last, we replicate that giving the whole pie virtually disappears if people
share 1,000e and the donations are concentrated around lower fractions. The
average donation of 43.09% in DG5A0 contrasts with 26.44% in DG1000A0;
17In particular, t = 0.273; p = 0.785 for DG50; t = −1.289; p = 0.206 for DG5A0 in
Study I and t = −1.135; p = 0.190 for DG5A0 in Study II; and t = 0.719; p = 0.473 for
DG1000A0.
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Figure 4: Donations in DG50, DG5A0 and DG1000A0
the difference is statistically strong (t − test = 3.185; p < 0.0001). This
corroborates Result 2: people decrease their giving under ambiguity if stakes
are high.
Result 4: Results 1 and 2 are replicated.
6 Conclusions
This study analyses whether people exploit the moral wiggle room and how
this depends on the stakes at play. We particularly focus on ambiguity as an
excuse to donate less to charities out of 5e or 1,000e.
We find an important effect of stakes on donations, but we reject the hy-
pothesis that people exploit the moral wiggle room generated by the ambigu-
ity. This result contrasts starkly with the previous literature. We attribute
this differences to one particular feature of our design: we do not introduce
any uncertainty through our payment mechanism. We pay for all the de-
cisions and the payment is independent across the decisions. We leave for
future research to analyze to what extent random payment schemes influence
giving under uncertainty and human behavior more generally.
17
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Appendix
A.1. Power calculations
In order to determine the simple size, we perform power calculations. First,
the average dictators’ donation in the literature is around 27% or 28% (Engel,
2011; Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2013), corresponding to 3e in a DG with 10 euros.
Assuming a standard deviation of 1.5e, we focus on two scenarios:
• one where the treatment increases/decreases donations by 20% (i.e.
0.4SD) and
• another one in which it increases/decreases by 30% (i.e. 0.6SD).
For an average treatment effect of 0.5SD with a power of 0.8 and a sig-
nificance level of 90%, we need a sample size of n = 90 in the case of a single
treatment (control + treatment), and n = 135 in case of two treatments
(control + treatment 1 + treatment 2). The corresponding figures for 0.4SD
are n = 136 and n = 204. For 0.33SD, the necessary sample size rises to
n = 200 and n = 300, respectively.
In this paper, we have a control and one treatment in Studies I and II; in
Study III, we have a control + two treatments. Hence, in Studies I and II,
we decided to take the most conservative option: an average effect of 0.33SD
with a power of 0.8 and a significance level of 90%. Therefore, the minimum
sample sizes in these studies are of n = 200.
Since Study III is a replication, we are less demanding a target an average
effect of 0.4SD, with a power of 0.8 and a significance level of 90%, leading
to a sample of at least n = 204.
A.2. Study I: Transition from to to t1
Here, we focus on participants’ second decision. It has been reported in
the literature that subjects “learn” to give less across games (Engel, 2011)
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but also that they take moral licenses in repeated settings, typically starting
being generous (see Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2013). Both effects would thus go in
the same direction in t = 1. As a result, we expect subjects being more selfish
in the second round of a repeated DG. In the following, we name “second-
round effect” the decrease in giving from t0 to t1. We have two treatments
(game orders) in Study I:
DG50 → DG5A1 Subjects move from certainty to ambiguity (i.e., we introduce ambiguity
in the second decision) and,
DG5A0 → DG51 subjects move from ambiguity to certainty (i.e., we remove ambiguity
in the second decision).
We expect a weaker second-round effect in the former because ambiguity
increases generosity (Result 1) while a reinforced second-round effect in T1
since ambiguity has been removed.
First, we study within-subject variations from t0 to t1 . In T0, we test
whether the introduction of ambiguity mitigates second-round effect. Sub-
jects donate 39.32% under certainty (t0) and subsequently 36.34% under
ambiguity gave in t1. That is, they decrease giving by 2.98%, a difference
that is insignificant (t− test = −0.537; p = 0.296).
Second, we analyze whether removing ambiguity reinforces second-round
effect. Subjects donate 50.79% under ambiguity (t0) and 37.70% under cer-
tainty (t1). Such an effect of 13.09%, is significant at 2% (t− test = −2.32;
p = 0.011).
We therefore conclude:
Result A1: The introduction (removal) of ambiguity ameliorates (boosts) second
round effect.
Observe that Result A1 reinforces the arguments against the hypothesis
of excuse-driven behavior.
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A.3. Study II: Transition from to to t1
We repeat the analysis from previous section. Again, there are two treat-
ments (game orders):
DG5A0 → DG1000A1 Subjects move from small to large stakes ambiguity (therefore we in-
troduce high stakes in the second decision).
DG1000A0 → DG5A1 Subjects move from large to small stakes under ambiguity (therefore
we remove high stakes in the second decision).
Since high stakes affect giving negatively (Result 2), we expect a larger
second-round effect in the former and smaller one in the latter order.
Individuals are indeed less generous (within-subjects) when they move
from small to large stakes under ambiguity: 51.22% vs. 24.86%. This cor-
responds to a decline of 26.41%; a change that is highly significant (t =
7.383; p < 0.0001). Second, moving from high to small stakes under ambi-
guity leads to average donations of 18.67% and 16.53%, respectively. This
difference is small and insignificant (t = 1.075; p = 0.142). We thus conclude:
Result A2: The introduction (removal) of high stakes under ambiguity increases
(ameliorates) second round effect.
This is consistent with Result 2 and reinforces the hypothesis that high
stakes under ambiguity reduce subjects’ generosity.
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A.4. High stakes in the Dictator Games under certainty
Table 1: List of studies analyzing stakes in the DG under certainty and their
average treatment effects.
Multiplication Givingl Givingh Treatment
Study Factor (%) (%) effect βˆ
Novakova and Flegr 1 (NF1) 10 28.30 27.90 -0.04
Novakova and Flegr 2 (NF2) 100 28.30 24.70 -0.036
Novakova and Flegr 3 (NF3) 1000 28.30 23.60 -0.005
Novakova and Flegr 4 (NF4) 10000 28.30 23.30 -0.001
Andersen et al. (AGKM1) 10 11.20 16.94 0.574
Carpenter et al. (CVB1) 10 33.00 25.00 -0.800
Raihani et al. 1 (R1) 5 48.80 48.00 -0.200
Raihani et al. 2 (R2) 10 47.80 37.00 -1.200
Raihani et al. 3 (R3) 5 54.40 48.00 -1.600
Raihani et al. 4 (R4) 10 48.90 48.00 -0.100
Leibbrandt et al. (LMN1) 100 25.00 3.67 -0.213
List and Cherry (LC1) 5 33.00 28.31 -0.938
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